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S.Ct. Docket No. 40544 
Blaine Co. No. CR-2011-2095 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state seeks review of the Idaho Court of Appeals' March 25, 2014 opinion, 
State v. Garcia, 2014 Opinion No. 21 (Idaho App., March 25, 2014) (hereafter "Opinion") 
(attached as Appendix A). Although that opinion affirmed the sufficiency of evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict, it vacated Garcia's conviction on a finding the trial court 
erred. Opinion at pp. 1, 10. The opinion held that where a jury - during deliberations -
asks to re-hear part of a witness's testimony, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to deny defendant's request to make the jury also re-hear parts of the witness's 
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testimony the jury did not request. Opinion at pp. 7-10. The Court of Appeals 
determined, despite support in the record to the contrary, that the denial of Garcia's 
request resulted in prejudice. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals 
substituted its discretion for that of the trial court regarding the re-reading of witness 
testimony and infringed upon the jury's role to weigh the evidence. Review of the Court 
of Appeals' opinion is appropriate because it departs from and is incompatible with this 
Court's precedent and past precedent of the Idaho Court of Appeals. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Garcia with felony aiding and abetting delivery of 
methamphetamine and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. (R., pp. 7-9, 88-97, 117-
124.) At trial, the state's primary witness was a confidential informant (CI) who 
arranged a "buy" of methamphetamine resulting in the charges against Garcia. (Tr., p. 
230, L. 20 - p. 232, L. 25; p. 239, Ls. 4-24; p. 241, L. 17 - p. 242, L. 25.) During 
deliberations, the jury asked to have the Cl's testimony from direct examination read 
back to them. (Tr., p. 424, Ls. 7-14.) Over defense counsel's objection, the court had 
the court reporter re-read the Cl's testimony as requested. (Tr., p. 424, L. 14 - p. 426, 
L. 25.) About half-way through the Cl's testimony from direct examination, the jury 
indicated it heard what it needed. (Tr., p. 428, L. 22 - p. 451, L. 14.) The jury found 
Garcia guilty of aiding and abetting delivery of methamphetamine. (Tr., p. 455, Ls. 1-4; 
R., p. 125.) 
Course Of Appellate Proceedings 
On appeal, Garcia argued the district court abused its discretion in allowing the 
re-reading of only part of the Cl's testimony. (Appellant's brief, p. 5.) Although he failed 
2 
to object at trial, Garcia also argued that it was fundamental error to allow the re-reading 
of testimony that had been stricken as hearsay when the CI initially testified. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 24-26.) 
The Court of Appeals found that any error in the re-reading of testimony 
previously stricken as hearsay was not fundamental error, as it related to "violation of a 
rule or statute," and not to "infringement upon a constitutional right." Opinion at p. 7. 
However, the Court determined the trial court erred in limiting the re-reading of the CI's 
testimony per the jury's request and over Garcia's objection. Opinion at pp. 7-10. The 
Court found the trial court failed to recognize it had discretion regarding the re-reading 
of the CI's testimony, and that the trial court should have ensured the re-reading 
included a balance of testimony favorable to the state and favorable to the defense. 
Opinion at pp. 9-10. The Court concluded that the trial court's erroneous ruling resulted 
in prejudice to Garcia, and thus vacated and remanded for further proceedings. Opinion 
at p. 10. 
The state filed a timely petition for review. 
ISSUE ON PETITION FOR REVIEW 
Is review proper because the Court of Appeals' decision conflicts with this Court's 
precedent and past precedent of the Idaho Court of Appeals by holding that the district 
court erred when it denied Garcia'S request to require the jury to re-hear testimony it did 
not request, in addition to testimony it did request for its deliberations? 
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ARGUMENT 
The Court Of Appeals' Decision Conflicts With This Court's Precedent And Past 
Precedent Of The Idaho Court Of Appeals By Holding That The District Court Erred 
When It Denied Garcia's Request To Require The Jury To Re-Hear Testimony It Did 
Not Request, In Addition To Testimony It Did Request For Its Deliberations 
A. Introduction 
In its decision, the Court of Appeals departed from existing Idaho precedent and 
found it is error for a trial court to deny the defendant's request that the read-back of a 
witness's testimony, asked for by the jury during deliberations, also include testimony 
not requested by the jury. Opinion at pp. 9-10. The Court found that "Garcia was 
prejudiced by the selective read-back" because the jury "did not rehear the defense's 
cross-examination" as requested by Garcia. Opinion at p. 9. Concluding that 
"testimony favoring the State was overemphasized," the Court of Appeals vacated 
Garcia's conviction. Opinion at p. 10. In doing so, the Court of Appeals substituted the 
district court's valid exercise of discretion with its own, and replaced the jury's fact-
finding role with its assessment of how the evidence should be weighed. Because the 
Court of Appeals' decision is incompatible with long-standing Idaho precedent, this 
Court should grant review. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Petitions for review by the Supreme Court are governed by criteria set forth in 
I. A. R. 118(b). In exercising its discretion to grant a petition, the Court considers, among 
other criteria: 
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance 
probably not in accord with applicable decisions of the Idaho Supreme 
Court or of the United States Supreme Court; [and] 
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict 
with a previous decision of the Court of Appeals. 
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I.A.R. 118(b)(2), (3). Review is warranted under these criteria. 
"'In cases that come before this Court on a petition for review of a Court of 
Appeals decision, this Court gives serious consideration to the views of the Court of 
Appeals, but directly reviews the decision of the lower court.'" State v. Sanchez, 149 
Idaho 102, 104,233 P.3d 33, 35 (2009) (quoting State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724, 
170 P.3d 387, 389 (2007)). An appellate court reviews a trial court's discretionary 
decisions for abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,51,205 P.3d 1185, 1187 
(2009); State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 190,254 P.3d 77, 91 (Ct. App. 2011). Where a 
defendant challenges the trial court's exercise of discretion, the appellate court 
considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) 
whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with 
applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision through 
an exercise of reason. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 396-97, 3 P.3d 67, 74-75 (Ct. 
App. 2000) (citation omitted). 
C. The Court Of Appeals' Decision Conflicts With This Court's Precedent And Past 
Precedent Of The Court Of Appeals Allowing The Partial Re-Reading Of A 
Witness's Testimony During Jury Deliberations 
Idaho courts have long held it appropriate for a trial court to allow a jury, during 
its deliberations, to re-hear a portion rather than all of a witness's testimony. State v. 
Jester, 46 Idaho 561, 270 P. 417, 421 (1928); State v. Leavitt, 44 Idaho 739, 260 P. 
164, 166 (1927). Current Idaho law provides: 
After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there is any disagreement between 
them as to the testimony, ... they must require the officer to conduct them into 
court ... [upon which] the information required must be given in the presence of, 
or after notice to, the prosecuting attorney and the defendant or his counsel. 
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I.C. § 19-2204 (emphasis added). If a jury makes a reasonable request for the re-
reading of testimony, the trial court must attempt to meet such request. State v. Couch, 
103 Idaho 205,208,646 P.2d 447, 450 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Nothing in the statute or Idaho case law allows a party to request or a court to 
order that the jury re-hear testimony the jury did not request. Rather, the re-reading of 
testimony is limited to resolving "any disagreement between [the jurors] as to the 
testimony." I.C. § 19-2204. In this case, the jury reasonably requested to re-hear part 
of one witness's testimony. Absent evidence the jury's disagreement extended to 
cross-examination, there was no statutory basis for Garcia's request. The trial court 
properly granted that request, consistent with Idaho law, therefore it did not err or abuse 
its discretion. 
The Court of Appeals, holding that the trial court must require the jury to receive 
a re-reading of testimony it did not request, created a requirement outside the statute 
and in conflict with Idaho precedent. In support of its unprecedented expansion of 
statutory and case law, the Court of Appeals cited its decision in Couch, 103 Idaho 205, 
646 P.2d 447. In that case, the Court of Appeals said that, in granting a jury's 
reasonable request to re-hear testimony from trial, "[t]he trial court should exercise its 
discretion to ensure that a party to the litigation is not prejudiced." lfL at 208, 646 P.2d 
at 450. But in finding that Garcia was prejudiced, the Court of Appeals focused its 
analysis on Garcia's request and not whether the jury's "disagreement ... as to the 
testimony" extended to cross-examination. The Court of Appeals found the district court 
erred by denying "Garcia's specific request that the [witness's] cross-examination be 
included." Opinion at p. 9. The Court determined that the witness's testimony on 
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cross-examination favored Garcia by challenging the witness's credibility, and by 
excluding it from the read-back, "testimony favoring the State was overemphasized." 
Opinion at pp. 9-10. The focus of the Court's inquiry is misplaced. 
Under Couch, the proper inquiry is not whether defendant was prejudiced by the 
denial of defendant's request to balance the jury's requested testimony with testimony 
favorable to the defendant. The proper inquiry is whether the granting of the jury's 
specific request caused either party to be prejudiced. An assessment whether granting 
the jury's selective re-reading prejudiced either party requires consideration of evidence 
regarding what prompted the jury's request. The record in this case includes such 
evidence. But that evidence was ignored by the Court of Appeals in its analysis. 
The jury specifically requested to re-hear the crs testimony from direct 
examination. (See Tr., p. 427, L. 8 - p. 428, L. 20; p. 451, Ls. 3-14.) Half-way through 
the re-reading of that testimony, the jury indicated it had heard what it wanted to hear. 
(Tr., p. 451, Ls. 3-14.) Opinion at p. 2 ("the jury informed the court that it had heard 
enough"). The record thus reflects that the jury had a specific factual concern 
addressed by a particular point in the crs testimony during direct examination. 
Focusing on the testimony that Garcia asked to be re-read, the Court of Appeals 
noted that the crs testimony on cross-examination challenged the CI's credibility, and 
should therefore have been included. Opinion at p. 9. This analysis is flawed for two 
reasons. First, inclusion of testimony challenging the witness's credibility is only 
relevant if the witness's. credibility is what prompted the jury's request. The record does 
not support the Court of Appeals' assumption that the witness's credibility is what 
prompted the jury's request here. Stated anotber way, the record does not support that 
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the "disagreement between [jurors] as to the [CI's] testimony" (I.C. § 19-2204) was a 
dispute over the Cl's general credibility. Second, there is no basis for the conclusion 
that, to ensure an adequate credibility determination, the trial court was obliged to 
compel the jury to re-hear parts of the trial they had not requested. Certainly the jury 
had sufficient opportunity to consider the Cl's credibility without being compelled to 
listen to cross-examination they had already heard once. Moreover, the part of the CI's 
testimony that was re-read to the jury did include information that challenged his 
credibility. (Tr., p. 430, L. 4 - p. 431, L. 19 (witness testified he received favorable 
treatment for being a confidential informant).) 
The Court of Appeals also expressed concern that, by not including the witness's 
testimony from cross-examination, the read-back failed to balance testimony favorable 
to the state with testimony favorable to the defendant. Opinion at pp. 9-10. Again, such 
consideration is irrelevant to the jury's request. Because the balancing of testimony 
favorable to the defendant was wholly unrelated to the jury's request, it would have 
been improper for the trial court to consider it in ruling on the request. A ruling that 
required the jury to re-hear "balancing" testimony - which the jury did not request -
would have placed undue weight on that testimony. In other words, such a ruling here 
would have given emphasis - unwarranted by the jury's request - to testimony favoring 
Garcia. The Court of Appeals' decision establishes a rule that, when a jury asks to re-
hear any evidence during deliberations, the request triggers an opportunity for the 
defendant to unduty influence deliberations in the name of balancing the requested 
testimorw with testimony favoring the defendant. Such a rule is contrary to applicable 
law. 
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Idaho law does not require the trial court to force a deliberating jury to re-hear 
testimony it did not ask to re-hear because the defendant has requested it. The record 
does not support the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Garcia was prejudiced by the 
exclusion of testimony the jury did not ask to re-hear. Accordingly, the Court of 
Appeals' holding that the trial court erred is contrary to this Court's precedent and past 
precedent of the Court of Appeals, and this Court should grant review to correct it. 
D. Contrary To Established Idaho Law, The Court Of Appeals Improperly 
Substituted Its Discretion For That Vested In The Trial Court, And Invaded The 
Jury's Fact-Finding Role Based On The Court of Appeals' Assessment Of How 
The Evidence Should Be Weighed 
In concluding the trial court abused its discretion, the Court of Appeals 
misapplied Idaho's well-established standard of review, set forth herein. The record 
supports that the trial court was aware of its discretion, and exercised that discretion 
consistently with applicable law and through exercise of reason. See Grist, 147 Idaho 
at 51, 205 P.3d at 1187; Carlson, 134 Idaho at 396-97, 3 P.3d at 74-75. In concluding 
otherwise, the Court of Appeals improperly substituted its discretion for that of the trial 
court, and replaced its assessment of the proper weight to give the evidence for the 
jury's. The Court of Appeals' analysis and holding are inconsistent with Idaho law. 
The Court of Appeals found the trial court "concluded that the parameters of what 
would be read were entirely up to the jury," and thus failed to recognize it had discretion 
in deciding what testimony would be re-read to the jury. Opinion at p. 9. This 
conclusion misidentifies the trial court's concern. The trial court expressed that, under 
I. C. § 19-2204, the jury's deliberations should be guided by the jury rather than the court 
or parties. (See Tr., p. 424, L. 16 - p. 426, L. 25.) The trial court did not say it lacked 
discretion to prevent prejudice, nor did it say it would strictly abide by the jury's request 
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even if there were evidence of prejudice. Given the context of the court's comments 
and instructions to the jury, the court was aware of its discretion: 
· .. as far as we know, all they want is the direct examination. 
· .. I think it's up to them to tell me what they want to hear, not up to 
me to tell them, no, you need to listen to this, also. 
So I'm going to say we're going to read the direct testimony, but 
there is also what is called cross-examination, and redirect, more 
questions by the state. And unless they tell me otherwise, we're simply 
going to read them the initial direct examination. 
· .. in my view, the jury can come in and say we want you to find a 
specific question and a specific answer and read that to us. And that's 
what they want. And I think it's the Court's obligation under the statute to 
give them what they want, not what I think they want or we want to give 
them. So I'm only going to give them what they want. 
(Tr., p. 425, L. 23 - p. 426, L. 25.) 
Even the non-binding out-of-jurisdiction cases cited by the Court of Appeals fail 
to support reversal of the trial court's ruling as abuse of discretion. See Opinion at pp. 
8-9. In one case, the New Jersey Supreme Court discussed a trial court's discretion to 
address a jury's request for playback of videotaped testimony, identifying guidelines, 
which included that "judges should ordinarily grant a jury's request to play back 
testimony," and 
(3) Court's should honor a jury's specific request to hear only 
limited parts of a witness' testimony - provided, once again, that playback 
includes relevant direct and cross examination. Jurors should not be 
required to watch or hear more testimony than they ask for. '" 
(5) Judges should take precautions to prevent juries from placing 
undue emphasis on the particular testimony that is replayed .... 
Opinton at pp. 8-9 (citing State v. Miller, 13 A.3d 873, 880-81 (N.J. 2011)). As already 
discussed, requiring the jury to re-hear testimony it did not request would have placed 
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undue emphasis on that unrequested testimony. Even if Miller applied here, it does not 
support the Court of Appeals' decision. 
The Court of Appeals notes that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals "has adopted 
a general rule that where a court allows a witness's testimony to be read back, in order 
to avoid prejudice to a party by emphasizing only certain parts of the testimony, the 
entire examination of the witness should be read." Opinion at p. 9 (citing States v. 
Newhoff, 627 F.3d 1163,1167-69 (9th Cir. 2010), and United States v. Richard, 504 
F.3d 1109, 1113-17 (9th Cir. 2007)). In its summary, the Court of Appeals omits a key 
basis for the holdings in these Ninth Circuit cases. In Newhoff, the Court based its 
finding of error on the trial court's failure to admonish the jury "against undue emphasis" 
in light of the selective read-back of testimony. 627 F.3d at 1168. The Court found that 
the error was plain because the trial court acknowledged the need for an admonition, 
but simply forgot to give one. 1s;l 
In Richard, the Court found the district court abused its discretion by allowing a 
selective replay of testimony from the state's key witness, and by taking "no precautions 
whatsoever to ensure that [the) jury did not unduly emphasize the selected testimony." 
504 F.3d at 1117 (emphasis original). In Richard, the Court noted that the trial court 
had directed the jury to '''let [the court) know what portion' of testimony it wanted to 
hear," thus crystallizing the undue emphasis on the selected testimony rather than 
lessening such risk. 1s;l at 1112, 1116-17. 
Even if· Richard and Newhoff were controlling authorities, which they are not, they 
are distinguishable here. In this case, the trial judge addressed the jury in open court, 
stating 
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We have received a note from the jury that says they wish to be 
read the CI testimony, and then that was clarified, State questions .... 
. . . There are three parts, at least, of the CI's testimony. There is 
what is called direct examination, which is the State's questions; and then 
there was cross-examination by the defendant; and then there was 
redirect, more questions by the state. At this point the only thing this says 
is "State questions," so I am assuming you only want the original 
questions by the State. 
If you want the - what I would call redirect, we would have that 
read, too, but we need to know that. Or if you want cross-examination, we 
need to know that, too. 
Right now I will have the direct read to you .... 
(Tr., p. 427, L. 8 - p. 428, L. 3.) The trial court's comments cautioned the jury against 
undue emphasis by reminding the jury of the entirety of the CI's testimony. 
The Court of Appeals' finding that Garcia was prejudiced by the partial read-back 
is belied by the record, as already discussed, and reflects disregard for the jury's role as 
fact-finder. The weighing of evidence is in the purview of the jury, not the courts or the 
parties. See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,712,215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009) (citing 
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 286, 77 P.3d 956, 975 (2003) (other citations omitted) 
("We will not substitute our own judgment for that of the jury on matters such as the 
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to certain evidence, and the 'reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence."')). By allowing a re-reading of the CI's 
testimony only as requested by the jury, the judge avoided directing the jury's attention 
to any particular evidence. The court ensured that the jury's request, for purposes of its 
deliberations, was fulfilled as required under I.C. § 19-2204, and that the jury - not the 
court or parties - guided the weighing of evidence that had been admitted at trial. 
The record demonstrates that the trial court was mindful of the jury's role, but 
exercised its discretion in accordance with the law with precautions to ensure that 
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neither Garcia nor the state was prejudiced. The Court of Appeals' conclusion that the 
trial court abused its discretion is contrary to the record and decisions of this Court as 
well as the Court of Appeals. The out-of-jurisdiction cases should not persuade this 
Court otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing arguments, the state respectfully requests that this Court 
grant its petition for review. 
DATED this 22nd day of April, 2014. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of April, 2014, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REVIEW by causing a copy addressed to: 
ELIZABETH A. ALLRED 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
~ Deputy Attorney General 
DJH 
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ROBERT JA VIER GARCIA, JR., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Blaine 
County. Hon. Robert J. Elgee, District Judge. 
Judgment of conviction vacated and case remanded. 
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Elizabeth A. Allred, Deputy 
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Daphne J. Huang, Deputy 
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
LANSING, Judge 
Robert Javier Garcia, Jr. appeals from his conviction for aiding and abetting delivery of 
methamphetamine. Garcia contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict and that the 
district court erred by granting the jury's request to have a portion of an informant's testimony 
read back to them after deliberations had begun. We affirm the sufficiency of the evidence, but 
vacate the conviction on the latter claim of error. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
In June or July of 2010, an individual was arrested for felony posseSSIOn of 
methamphetamine. In exchange for reduction of the charge to an unspecified misdemeanor, he 
agreed to cooperate with law enforcement in pursuit of drug distributors. In August 2010, this 
individual (hereinafter "informant'), at the behest of a Blaine County detective, telephoned 
1 8 
o 
Ricardo V argas-Hurtado and arranged to buy one-eighth of an ounce of methamphetamine. The 
transaction was set to take place on August 25, 2010, at a Hailey, Idaho apartment building. 
Before the appointed time for the meeting, the police outfitted the informant with an 
audio recording device and gave him $350 in marked bills, and four officers set up surveillance. 
As a result of the transaction that followed, Garcia was charged with aiding and abetting delivery 
of methamphetamine, Idaho Code §§ 37-2732(a)(1)(A), 18-204. The State alleged that Garcia 
delivered the methamphetamine to Jose Hurtado-Delatorre who in turn delivered it to the 
informant. 
At Garcia's trial, the informant described events that occurred following his arrival to 
pick up the drugs at the arranged meeting with Vargas-Hurtado. The informant said that when 
he arrived, Vargas-Hurtado and Hurtado-Delatorre were outside on the front lawn. Hurtado-
Delatorre made a phone call and told the informant that the methamphetamine would be there in 
about an hour. A short time later, defendant Garcia drove up in a white Mercedes SUV. The 
informant knew Garcia from previous encounters, but their conversation at the scene was limited 
to saying hello. Garcia and Hurtado-Delatorre spoke, but the informant was not privy to their 
conversation. After Garcia left, Hurtado-Delatorre told the informant that it would be about 
another half hour before the methamphetamine arrived. The informant gave Hurtado-Delatorre 
the buy money. Awhile later, Garcia again drove up. Hurtado-Delatorre went to Garcia's 
vehicle and spoke to him, but again the informant was not privy to their conversation. After 
Garcia left, Hurtado-Delatorre delivered the methamphetamine to the informant. 
Following submission of the case to the jury, the jury asked that the informant's 
testimony on the State's direct examination be read back to them. The defense objected to the 
reading of only the informant's direct testimony, contending that the cross-examination should 
also be read because "a lot of the answers of the confidential informant changed or were 
significantly clarified by the cross-examination." The district court overruled the defense 
objection, stating that it would not tell the jury what it wanted to rehear. The direct examination 
was then read in open court. The reading stopped about halfway through the direct examination 
when the jury informed the court that it had heard enough. The jury thereafter returned a verdict 
of guilty. 
Following the verdict, Garcia renewed an earlier request for an Idaho Criminal Rule 29 
judgment of acquittal on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt. The 
2 
o 
district court denied the motion. Garcia appeals, contending that the court erred in denying his 
motion for acquittal and in allowing a read-back of part of the informant's direct testimony 
without including the cross-examination. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Denial of I.c.R. 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
Garcia first contends that because the evidence was insufficient to convict, the district 
court erred in denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 29 post-verdict motion for a judgment of 
acquittal. That rule mandates that a trial court enter a judgment of acquittal "if the evidence is 
insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses." LC.R. 29(a). In ruling on 
Garcia's motion, the district court expressed its view that "this is a very, very, very, close case" 
and that a finding of guilt or innocence "turns on a razor's edge." But, the court reasoned, "The 
jury [felt] there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt" and "in view of the jury's fmding, I'm not 
willing to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal." 
Garcia first argues that the district court erred by deferring to the jury's verdict, thereby 
abdicating its duty to independently evaluate the evidence for sufficiency. If that is what 
occurred, then Garcia would be correct that it was error. If deference to the jury verdict resolved 
the matter, there would be no reason for the LC.R. 29(c) authorization for post-verdict motions 
for a judgment of acquittal. However, whether the district court erred in this respect is not 
dispositive because on appeal this Court conducts a de novo review of the denial of a motion for 
a judgment of acquittal. We independently consider the evidence to determine whether a 
reasonable mind could conclude that the defendant's guilt as to each material element of the 
offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Dietrich, 135 Idaho 870, 873, 26 P.3d 
53,56 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Kapsa, 126 Idaho 512, 521, 887 P.2d 57, 66 (Ct. App. 1994); 
State v. Printz, 115 Idaho 566, 567, 768 P.2d 829, 830 (Ct. App. 1989). In assessing the 
sufficiency of evidence, we will uphold a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict so 
long as there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could conclude that the 
prosecution proved all essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712,215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009). Evidence is substantial if a reasonable 
trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has 
been proven. Id; State v. Tankovich, 155 Idaho 221, 228, 307 P.3d 1247, 1254 (Ct. App. 2013). 
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I) 
On appeal, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. 
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 286, 77 P.3d 956, 975 (2003). In assessing the sufficiency of 
evidence, we will not substitute our own judgment for that of the jury on matters such as the 
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to certain evidence, and the reasonable inferences 
to be drawn from the evidence. Severson, 147 Idaho at 712, 215 P.3d at 432. 
Garcia asserts that the trial evidence did not sufficiently show that he is the person who 
delivered methamphetamine to Hurtado-Delatorre. Garcia notes there was testimony showing 
that a number of people arrived and left during the time that the informant was present at the 
scene and that Hurtado-Delatorre left the scene in his car at one time and then returned. Garcia 
argues Hurtado-Delatorre could have obtained the drugs from any of the other people or when he 
left the scene or even, given the relatively small amount of the substance, from his pocket. The 
defense further notes, correctly, that this case was tried almost exclusively on the testimony of 
the informant, that the informant did not testify to any incriminating statements by Garcia, and 
that the informant admitted that he was not in a position to directly observe any exchange of 
money or drugs between Garcia and Hurtado-Delatorre. The defense further emphasizes that no 
buy money was ever recovered from Garcia and there was no evidence, independent of the 
informant's testimony, tending to show that Garcia delivered the drugs. 
Sufficiency of the evidence, however, is determined from the evidence that was 
presented, not solely from the evidence that was absent. Applying our standards of review, we 
conclude that there was substantial circumstantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Garcia delivered the drugs to Hurtado-Delatorre. 
The evidence showed that after Hurtado-Delatorre made a phone call and told the informant that 
the methamphetamine would be there in about an hour, Garcia arrived. He and Hurtado-
Delatorre spoke. Soon after Garcia left, Hurtado-Delatorre told the informant that it would be 
about another half hour before the methamphetamine arrived. From this one can reasonably 
infer the Hurtado-Delatorre learned from Garcia that the delivery of the methamphetamine would 
be delayed. A short while later, Garcia again drove up and Hurtado-Delatorre went up to the 
defendant's vehicle and spoke to him. Immediately after Garcia again left, Hurtado-Delatorre 
gave drugs to the informant, again raising a very logical inference that Garcia was the source of 
the drugs and had just delivered them to Hurtado-Delatorre. Garcia's theory that Hurtado-
Delatorre could have acquired the drugs from someone else or while he was away from the scene 
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is countered by the actions that Hurtado-Delatorre took on two occasions promptly after meeting 
with Garcia. 
Although the evidence cannot be characterized as overwhelming, it is sufficient to 
rationally support a finding of Garcia's guilt. The relative weakness of the State's case, 
however, informs our decision on the next issue. 
B. Reading Back Testimony to the Jury 
After beginning its deliberations, the jury informed the court that it wished to again hear 
the informant's testimony on direct examination. The defense objected to a reading of only the 
witness's direct examination, contending that the cross-examination of the informant should also 
be read back because it had significantly discredited the witness's direct examination. The 
district court overruled the objection, concluding that it was up to the jury to determine what it 
wanted to rehear. The court stated: 
[IJn my view, the jury can come in and say we want you to find a specific 
question and a specific answer and read that to us. And that's what they want. 
And I think it's the Court's obligation under the statute to give them what they 
want, not what I think they want or we want to give them. So I'm only going to 
give them what they want. 
The direct examination was then read to the jury. It ceased halfway through that examination 
when the jury informed the court that it had heard what it needed. 
Garcia contends that the district court erred in two ways. First, he argues that it was error 
for the court to allow reading of the portion of the informant's direct testimony containing 
inadmissible hearsay that had, on defense objection, been struck from the record. I Second, he 
That testimony occurred as follows: 
Q. Did you receive any meth at that time while Robert was there the first time? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. And did you know why? 
A. Jose Hurtado told me that he would go get it from his house. 
Q. Do you know who he--who is "he"? 
A. Robert. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. What Jose Hurtado 
says is complete hearsay. 
THE COURT: I'll sustain it. 
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asserts, as he did below, that the district court abused its discretion by not including the cross-
examination of the informant in the testimony that was read back. He argues that this action by 
the trial court gave undue emphasis to the State's inculpatory evidence while minimizing his 
cross-examination that significantly undercut the persuasiveness of the State's evidence. 
1. Reading back stricken testimony 
With respect to the first issue, Garcia contends that the stricken testimony was 
inadmissible and highly prejudicial in the first instance, and that repeating it a second time to the 
jury only served to heighten the prejudicial effect. This claim of error we do not consider, 
however, for it was not preserved by objection below. Although the defense objected to the 
hearsay testimony during the witness's examination and obtained a court order striking it from 
the record, the defense did not object when the same questions and answers were read back to the 
jury, together with the order striking the testimony. No doubt, the reading of the stricken 
testimony could have been prevented py a timely objection when the read-back occurred. 
Claims of error that were not preserved by objection below will not be considered for the first 
time on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992); Person v. State, 
147 Idaho 453, 455, 210 P.3d 561, 563 (Ct. App. 2009). 
Garcia asserts, however, that this error may be addressed for the first time on appeal 
because it amounts to fundamental error. Idaho appellate courts may consider a claim of error to 
which no objection was made in the trial court if the issue presented rises to the level of 
fundamental error. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007); State v. 
THE COURT: So the jury is instructed to disregard the answer to that 
question of the statement as to what Jose told him. 
Q. All right. And do you remember why you gave [the buy money] to [Jose 
Hurtado] at that time? 
A. I recall because he was going to give it to Robert Garcia for the meth. 
Q. Okay. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. That's not based on 
personal knowledge. 
THE COURT: I'll sustain an objection to the "he was going to give it 
Robert." He's testifying to what someone else was going to do, so I'll sustain it, 
and you're instructed to disregard the statement as to what someone else was 
going to do. 
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Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 251, 486 P.2d 260, 262 (1971); State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 886-87, 
303 P.3d 241,245-46 (Ct. App. 2013). A fundamental error is one that (1) violates one or more 
of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) is clear or obvious without the need for 
reference to any additional information not contained in the appellate record; and (3) affected the 
outcome of the trial proceedings. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010). 
Garcia contends that the re-reading of stricken testimony violated his due process right to 
a fair trial and that the first prong of Perry is thus satisfied here. We disagree. The substance of 
the claimed error is that the jury should not have been exposed a second time to testimony that 
was hearsay and therefore inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 802. Where the asserted 
error relates not to infringement upon a constitutional right, but to violation of a rule or statute, 
the fundamental error doctrine is not implicated. State v. Jackson, 151 Idaho 376, 256 P.3d 784 
(Ct. App. 2011). "To hold that the presentation of evidence and associated argument in violation 
of an evidentiary rule satisfies the constitutional violation element of Perry because all 
evidentiary error implicates due process would, in our view, virtually eviscerate the first prong of 
the Perry standard and contravene the limits that Perry places on fundamental error review." ld. 
at 379-80,256 PJd at 787-88. See also State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 184-87,254 P.3d 77, 85-
88 (Ct. App. 2011). Here, Garcia's initial hearsay objections to the testimony were sustained. 
When the stricken testimony was later read back and the jury heard the same information, in 
violation of the same evidence rule, a second time, it remained only a violation of a rule of 
evidence. Thus, while allowing the stricken testimony to be read back was undoubtedly error, it 
was not an error of constitutional dimension reviewable as fundamental error. 
2. Excluding cross-examination 
Garcia did challenge, by timely objection, the district court's decision to permit the jury 
to hear again a portion of the informant's testimony without including the cross-examination. 
The district court based its decision to allow the read-back upon Idaho Code § 19-2204, 
which provides: 
After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there is any disagreement 
between them as to the testimony, or if they desire to be informed on any point of 
law arising in the cause, they must require the officer to conduct them into court. 
Upon being brought into court, the information required must be given in the 
presence of, or after notice to, the prosecuting attorney and the defendant or his 
counsel, or after they have been called. 
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Our Supreme Court has held that reading back only a portion of a witness's testimony at the 
request of the jury, as authorized by the statute, is not error per se. State v. Jester, 46 Idaho 561, 
573,270 P. 417, 421 (1928); State v. Leavitt, 44 Idaho 739, 746-47,260 P. 164, 166 (1927). In 
State v. Couch, 103 Idaho 205, 646 P.2d 447 (Ct. App. 1982), however, this Court addressed 
concerns involved in reading back testimony to the jury. We observed that the weight of 
authority in this country holds that reading of all or part of the testimony of one or more of the 
witnesses at the request of the jury is discretionary with the trial court, but we further said, "It is, 
of course, essential that evidence is not so selected, nor used in such a manner that there is a 
likelihood of it being given undue weight or emphasis by the jury." Id. at 208, 646 P.2d at 450. 
We held that the trial court must attempt to meet any reasonable requests by the jury for the re-
reading of testimony, but that the court also should exercise its discretion to ensure that a party to 
the litigation is not prejudiced. Id. As an example of a prejudicial practice, we referred to State 
v. Ross, 510 P.2d 109, III (N.M. Ct. App. 1973), where the New Mexico Supreme Court held 
that the defendant was prejudiced when the trial court permitted the jury to listen again to only a 
taped conversation even though there was also oral testimony that favored the defendant and 
conflicted with the statements that had been recorded. Id. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently provided the following guidelines to inform trial 
courts' exercise of discretion in addressing a jury's request for a playback of videotaped 
testimony: 
(l) As noted before, judges should ordinarily grant a jury's request to play 
back testimony .... 
(2) As a general rule, after redacting sidebars and inadmissible testimony 
to which counsel objected, the entire testimony requested should be played back--
including direct and cross examination--so that evidence may be considered in its 
proper context. Only then can a jury hear both direct proofs as well as 
inconsistencies and impeachment material. Trial judges nonetheless retain 
discretionary authority to try to narrow ajury's request if it calls for the playback 
of extensive testimony. 
(3) Courts should honor a jury's specific request to hear only limited parts 
of a witness' testimony--provided, once again, that playback includes relevant 
direct and cross examination. Jurors should not be required to watch or hear more 
testimony than they ask for. If necessary, the trial judge can clarify what 
testimony the jury wants repeated. 
(4) Playbacks, like read-backs, should take place in open court with all 




(5) Judges should take precautions to prevent juries from placing undue 
emphasis on the particular testimony that is replayed. To that end, at the time the 
testimony is repeated, judges should instruct jurors to consider all ofthe evidence 
. presented and not give undue weight to the testimony played back. 
(6) Judges should make a precise record of what was played back to the 
jury. 
State v. Miller, 13 A.3d 873, 880-81 (N.J. 2011) (citations omitted). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted a general rule that where a court allows a 
witness's testimony to be read back, in order to avoid prejudice to a party by emphasizing only 
certain parts of the testimony, the entire examination of the witness should be read. United 
States v. Newhoff, 627 F.3d 1163, 1167-69 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Richard, 504 F.3d 
1109, 1113-17 (9th Cir. 2007). 
We do not adopt a broad rule that any read-back of testimony must include all of that 
witness's testimony. We do, however, find error here in the denial of Garcia's specific request 
that the cross-examination be included. First, the district court appears not to have recognized 
that it had the discretion to require reading of more testimony than the jury specifically 
requested. The court instead concluded that the parameters of what would be read were entirely 
up to the jury. Thus, the district court did not recognize the scope of its discretion. 2 Second, 
Garcia was prejudiced by the selective read-back. The jury heard a second time only the State's 
examination of the informant. It did not rehear the defense's cross-examination where it 
emphasized that the informant's testimony was provided in exchange for favorable treatment in a 
felony criminal case, thus challenging the informant's credibility. The jury also did not rehear, 
among other favorable defense testimony, that a number of other men who could have provided 
the methamphetamine to Hurtado-Delatorre were present at the scene, that Hurtado-Delatorre 
had left the scene in his car for a time and then returned, that defendant Garcia was not present 
when the informant gave Hurtado-Delatorre the buy money, and that the informant did not see 
any exchange of the drugs or money between Garcia and Hurtado-Delatorre. We conclude that, 
2 Although the court appropriately attempted to honor the jury's request and not steer the 
jury to particular testimony, in some circumstances the court should consider the need to ensure 
that the testimony to be re-read is not given undue weight. For instance, if the testimony to be 
re-read was later unequivocally recanted, the court must consider that fact in exercising its 
discretion. While this case is not that striking, the court should have considered the need to 




under these circumstances, reading of only a portion of the witness's testimony was prejudicial 
in this case. In the absence of re-reading the cross-examination, the testimony favoring the State 
was overemphasized. 
Because this error was preserved for appeal by defense objection, the State bears the 
burden of establishing that the error was harmless. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 
961, 974 (2010). As stated in the preceding section, the State's case was predicated almost 
exclusively upon the informant's testimony. The defendant's cross-examination of the informant 
both gave reason to question the informant's credibility and demonstrated that there were 
possible sources, other than Garcia, of the drugs that were ultimately delivered to the informant. 
We conclude that the error was not harmless and therefore vacate the conviction. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The judgment of 
conviction is vacated, however, because of court error in reading back to the jury only a portion 
of the primary witness's testimony. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
Judge GRATTON and Judge MELANSON CONCUR. 
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